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Imogen Dickie and Gurpreet Rattan, University of Toronto
This paper is about the relation between a singular term’s cognitive significance
and the requirements on using the term to communicate. A term’s ‘cognitive
significance’ is the part of its meaning that determines its role in a speaker’s rational
cognitive life.  Terms ‘a’ and ‘b’ differ in cognitive significance iff a subject who
understood both terms could assent to ‘a is F’ but withhold assent from or reject ‘b is F’
without loss of rational coherence. Here are three views of the relation between cognitive
significance and communication that philosophers have proposed:
The Fregean View – Speakers can communicate using a term iff they attach the same
sense to it, where senses are individuated by the criterion of individuation for cognitive
significance.
1
  
The Anti-Fregean View – Speakers can communicate using a term iff they attach the
same referent to it (take it to stand for the same thing).
The Moderate Fregean View – Speakers can communicate using a term iff (a) they take it
to stand for the same thing, and (b) they attach appropriately related cognitive
significances to it, where ‘appropriately related’ cognitive significances are just the
cognitive significances that might be attached to the term by speakers who count as
understanding one another’s uses of it.
Our aims here are to overturn the Moderate Fregean View, and to get our own alternative
position, which we call ‘Equivalence Class Fregeanism’, (‘ECF’) on the table. It is not
possible to provide a full defense of ECF here. Nor is it possible to discuss in detail how
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 The question of the extent to which the ‘Fregean View’ was Frege’s is not relevant to our purposes here.
But for the criterion of difference for senses understood as cognitive significances see ‘On Sense and
Reference’ in Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, eds. P. Geach and M. Black
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960), 56-78, at 56-57. And for the claim that speakers can communicate using
an expression iff they attach the same sense to it see ‘The Thought’ in Gottlob Frege: Collected Papers on
Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984) 357-360, 368, 371.
2close ECF comes to what Frege himself thought. But we think it is possible to show that
the Moderate Fregean View is false, and to establish that the question of whether there is
such a thing as Fregean sense should be addressed by considering whether ECF can be
sustained.
2
The paper has three parts. §1 presents the Moderate Fregean View as a response
to the Anti-Fregean View. §2 uses a worked example to show that the Moderate Fregean
View is unstable. §3 argues that a right understanding of the significance of Frege’s
puzzle about informative identities opens up the possibility of a view (ECF) which is
much more Fregean than the Moderate Fregean View, but respects the pressures away
from the Fregean claim that speakers can use a term to communicate iff they use it with
the same cognitive significance.
1  The Moderate Fregean response to the Anti-Fregean View
The Moderate Fregean response to the Anti-Fregean View has had its most
thorough development to date in two papers by Richard Heck: ‘The Sense of
Communication’ and ‘Do Demonstratives Have Senses?’
3
 Heck argues that the Anti-
Fregean View (which he calls the ‘Hybrid View’) is unstable, and urges the Moderate
Fregean alternative. This section sets out the main lines of Heck’s position.
According to Heck, the Hybrid View is motivated by the underlying principle that
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 Others have objected to Heck’s defense of the Moderate Fregean View from the opposite, neo-Russellian,
direction. See Alex Byrne and Michael Thau, ‘In Defense of the Hybrid View,’ Mind 105 (1996), 139-149.
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 The possibility of a Moderate Fregean position is also floated by Kaplan at ‘Demonstratives’ 537-538 and
Gareth Evans at The Varieties of Reference (Oxford University Press, 1985) 315-316.
3communication has the transmission of information from one speaker to another as a
basic function or aim.
4
 Suppose this principle. Then to use a name to communicate,
speakers must at least attach the same referent to the name. For a hearer acquires
information from a speaker’s utterance only if the hearer takes the utterance to be about
the right object. Further, given the principle, it seems that to use a name to communicate
speakers must at most attach the same referent to it. For as long at they attach the same
referent to it, they will be able to use it to transmit information. So if the aim of
communication is the transmission of information, then for speaker and hearer to attach
the same referent to a name is necessary and sufficient for communication. Therefore, if
we accept the principle, we have a motivation for the Hybrid View.
Heck’s criticisms of the Hybrid View are constructed around examples which
suggest that the principle that communication aims at the transmission of information is
really just an artificially weakened version of a stronger claim – the claim that
communication aims at the transmission of knowledge.
5
  Here are two examples of this
kind.
6
Suppose that Tony uses ‘George Orwell’ to refer to the same man as Alex refers
to using the name ‘Eric Blair’. Suppose that Tony does not know that Orwell is Blair.
And suppose that Alex asserts, in Tony’s presence ‘Eric Blair wrote 1984’. Finally,
suppose that, by causal paths which need not concern us, Tony forms the belief that she
would express by saying ‘George Orwell wrote 1984’. Tony’s belief is about the right
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 Heck presents these examples at ‘The Sense of Communication’ 94-95.
4object – she is taking Alex’s use of ‘Eric Blair’ to refer to the same object as Alex takes it
to refer to. So, Tony and Alex count, on this occasion, as using ‘Eric Blair’ to refer to the
same thing.
If the basic aim of communication is the transmission of information, then Alex
and Tony are communicating. But this seems like a wrong account of the example. If, by
contrast, communication is construed as involving the transmission of knowledge, we get
the right result – that Alex and Tony do not communicate. Forming the belief that you
would express by saying ‘George Orwell wrote 1984’ in response to someone’s assertion
of ‘Eric Blair wrote 1984’ is not a way to acquire knowledge if you do not know that
George Orwell is Eric Blair. So this example suggests that communication is not the
transmission of information but the transmission of knowledge, and that it does not
suffice for a transaction between speakers involving a use of a name to count as
communication that they attach the name to the same bearer.
Now suppose that Eric Blair becomes amnesiac and checks himself into a
hospital. The doctor, Tony, though knowing nothing about the past life of her amnesiac
patient, happens to light on ‘George Orwell’ as a name to use for her patient (she does not
know that this is a name already in circulation). Some time later, Alex, intending to refer
to the well-known author, says to Tony, ‘George Orwell wrote 1984’. Tony forms the
belief she would express by saying ‘George Orwell wrote 1984’ (‘and poor guy now he’s
an amnesiac in a hospital bed’). Since Tony’s patient in fact happens to be the author
George Orwell/ Eric Blair, Tony and Alex are using ‘George Orwell’ with the same
referent.
Again, if the basic aim of communication is the transmission of information, then
5Alex and Tony are communicating. But, again, this seems wrong. And, again, if
communication is construed as involving the transmission of knowledge, we get the right
result – that Alex and Tony do not communicate. Since it is just a matter of luck that the
belief Tony forms is about the person Alex is claiming to have written 1984, it just a
matter of luck that Tony’s belief is true. And lucky true belief is not knowledge.
Heck thinks that reflection on examples like these suggests that successful
communication requires the kind of intensional – ‘cognitive and epistemological’
7
 –
relations between the belief the speaker expresses using a sentence and the belief a hearer
takes it to express that the Hybrid View is supposed to be doing without. Any account of
the conditions under which communication is possible which does not draw on cognitive
and epistemological relations between beliefs will be an account under which the
conditions for communication come out as distinct from those for the transmission of
knowledge. And any such account will be subject to counterexamples like the two we
have just set out: counterexamples in which the supposed conditions for communication
are met, but which cannot count as cases of communication because they could not be
cases of the transmission of knowledge.
8
Heck’s positive proposal is that in order to communicate using a name speakers
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6must use it to refer to the same thing, and must also associate it with ‘suitably related’
cognitive significances, where the cognitive significances speakers attach to a name are
‘suitably related’ iff speakers are able to understand each other’s uses of the name. This
line of thought leads Heck to a conclusion that is intermediate between the Anti-Fregean
(Hybrid) View and Fregean View. According to this intermediate position, successful
communication requires that speaker and hearer attach to the name both the same
referent, and suitably related cognitive significances, where ‘suitably related’ is to be read
as weaker than ‘the same’. So Heck endorses both of the following claims:
9
1 A speaker who understands a use of a name ν attaches a cognitive significance to it.
2 Speaker S1 understands speaker S2’s use of ν iff the cognitive significances that S1
and S2 attach to S2’s use of ν are suitably related.
This is not the Hybrid View. For Heck is maintaining that successful communication
demands more than sameness of referent. Nor, however, is it Frege’s view. Frege thought
that successful communication using an expression requires that speaker and hearer
attach not just appropriately related, but identical, cognitive significances to it.
Heck recognises
10
 the temptation to try to reinstate the notion of sense and a more
fully Fregean view by replacing 2 with
2* Speaker S1 understands speaker S2’s  use of ν iff S1 and S2 attach the same sense to
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7S2’s use of ν, where a ‘sense’ is an equivalence class of cognitive significances
(the equivalence class of cognitive significances which might be attached to a
token name by speakers who can use it to communicate).
But he says that this temptation should be resisted because to adopt this kind of view
would be to ‘define something shared [shared sense] into existence’.
11
 It would be to
create ‘a theoretical construct looking for work’.
12
We take Heck’s point to be this. The proposed equivalence class of cognitive
significances will be able to perform a genuinely Fregean role – the role of explaining
why there is successful communication in some cases but not others, rather than just
letting us classify some cases and not others as cases of communication – only if there is
an account to be had of what unifies the members of the equivalence class other than just
that they are cognitive significances that speakers who can communicate using a name
might be attaching to it. But there is no such account to be had. So saying that speakers
attach to uses of names cognitive significances which are members of this equivalence
class is just another way of saying that they can use the name to communicate: the first
claim cannot explain the second.
We have no quarrel with Heck’s criticism of the Hybrid View. We endorse his
claim that the Hybrid View depends on the principle that communication aims at the
transmission of information.
13
 We agree that this principle is just an anemic stand-in for
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 It is worth noting that this will not in general be acceptable to the proponent of the Anti-Fregean View.
She will insist that the Hybrid View is a view about the semantics of names, but communication involves
semantic as well as pragmatic elements and that these have not been separated properly by any Fregean
view, moderate or full-blown. She will insist further that Heck’s examples should be explained
8the principle that communication aims at the transmission of knowledge. And we agree
that if communication aims at the transmission of knowledge an account of the conditions
for communication must appeal to the kinds of relations between cognitive significances
that the Hybrid View is supposed to be doing without.
Our disagreement with Heck concerns the intermediate position that he proposes
in the attempt to do justice to both Fregean and anti-Fregean pressures. According to
Heck’s intermediate position there is an equivalence class of ways of thinking of a
name’s referent that speakers who understand one another’s uses of the name attach to it.
But, Heck says, there is no more we can say about what unites the equivalence class of
cognitive significances than that they are the cognitive significances attached to a name
by speakers who can use it to communicate. This is why he thinks it is not open to take a
step back towards Frege by identifying a name’s sense with the equivalence class of
cognitive significances associated with it by speakers who can use it to communicate.
And this is the element of Heck’s positive view with which we want to take issue. We
want to suggest that it is possible to say what unites the members of the equivalence class
of cognitive significances associated with a name by speakers who understand one
another’s uses of it beyond just that they can use the name to communicate. And we
suggest that if this possibility can be made out, Heck’s contention that the move from 2 to
                                                                                                                                                  
pragmatically and not semantically. To respond to the Anti-Fregean on the viability of this kind of
pragmatic strategy is an important task, but one that goes beyond the scope of this paper. (For critical
discussion from a Fregean perspective of one kind of pragmatic strategy, see §2.2 of William Taschek,
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of the pragmatic strategy from a non-Fregean perspective see Theodore Sider and David Braun, ‘Kripke’s
Revenge’, Philosophical Studies 128 (2006), 669-682 and Ben Caplan, ‘Millian Descriptivism’,
Philosophical Studies 133 (2007), 181-198.) Our critical aim is to reveal the unstable character of the
Moderate Fregean View and to outline a more fully Fregean view that nevertheless respects the pressures to
which the Fregean view is subject and that occasion the Moderate Fregean View. This is obviously a more
modest undertaking than that of refuting the Anti-Fregean View. Thanks to anonymous referees for
stressing these issues.
92* can give us only an artificial construct which performs no genuine explanatory role
will be overturned.
We shall call the view that a name’s sense is the equivalence class of cognitive
significances that speakers who can use the name to communicate associate with it
‘Equivalence Class Fregeanism’ (‘ECF’). We take it that the main obstacle to ECF is just
the obstacle that Heck identifies, namely that of providing an account of what unites the
elements of the equivalence classes. In the final two sections of the paper we show how
we think this obstacle can be overcome. We begin in §2 with a worked example that we
then develop at a more theoretical level in §3.
2 A worked example
Consider the following passage from Heck:
Suppose someone says, “That bottle is half-empty”. Must I think of the bottle in the very
same way that she does if I am to understand her? I think not. If I can perceive the bottle
– if I can think of it demonstratively – I may well be in a position to know which bottle is
in question: I may know that she is demonstrating that bottle and so know that her
utterance is true if, and only if, that bottle is half-empty. If so, I will understand her
utterance: I will know its truth condition. But my perspective on the bottle may be
sufficiently different from hers that my Thought is, by the usual Fregean criterion,
different from the one the speaker was expressing. Someone could believe that that bottle
is half-empty when she thinks about it in a demonstrative way appropriate to perceiving it
from one side, while denying that it is half-empty (or being agnostic about the matter)
when she thinks of it in a demonstrative way appropriate to perceiving it from the other
side: she might well fail to realize that the same bottle is in question both times.
14
This kind of case is familiar enough. Two people are using a perceptual demonstrative to
refer to the same object. Their different spatial perspectives on the object are such that
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you could take each of these perspectives in turn and, without loss of rational coherence,
doubt whether the object seen from each is the same. Heck sees this kind of example as
being of considerable significance. In particular, he thinks this kind of example gives
strong support to the idea that speakers can communicate using an expression even
though they do not attach the same Fregean sense to it. This is the Moderate Fregean
description of the situation. We suggest that Heck is misdescribing the example, and that
getting the description right opens the way for a defense of ECF.
As a first move towards a right account of the example, consider the fact that in
the passage we have quoted Heck is actually raising two different cases of the use of a
demonstrative. The first is a case of what has come to be called ‘joint attention’: speaker
and hearer are able to understand one another’s uses of the demonstrative in virtue of the
fact that they are jointly attending to its referent. The second is a case in which a single
subject uses two perceptual demonstratives without realising that the demonstratives co-
refer and without loss of rational coherence. In this passage Heck, in effect, reasons from
facts about the second case to a conclusion about what is going on in the first.
The reasoning implicit in the passage can be reconstructed like this. Suppose that
at time t1 I am thinking about an object in a demonstrative way appropriate to perceiving
it from one side. Suppose that at t2 I am thinking about the same object in a demonstrative
way appropriate to perceiving it from the opposite side. In this case, I could doubt that the
objects I am thinking about on each occasion are the same. And my doubt would be a
rationally coherent doubt. But Fregean sense just is that level of content which explains
why this kind of mistake does not involve rational incoherence. So it follows (‘by the
usual Fregean criterion’) that the demonstrative ways of thinking I employ on each
11
occasion constitute distinct Fregean senses. Now consider a case in which you and I are
in a position to communicate about an object in virtue of the fact that we are jointly
attending to it. In this case, the only candidate to be the way of thinking of the object that
I am employing is the demonstrative way appropriate to perceiving it from my
perspective. And the only candidate to be the way of thinking of the object that you are
employing is the demonstrative way appropriate to perceiving it from your perspective.
But we know, from consideration of the case of a single subject, that these ways of
thinking are distinct. It follows that this is a case in which subjects use a term (‘that
bottle’) in successful communication about an object even though they do not associate
the term with the same Fregean sense.
To bring out what is wrong with this reasoning we ask the reader to bear with us
as we describe four varieties of ‘that bottle’ case:
(A) I say (while attending to a bottle at time t1 from perspective π1 and intending to
refer to it) ‘That[said at t1 from perspective π1] is half-full’. I then walk around the bottle,
attending to it all the while. When I get to the other side I say, still intending to refer
to the bottle I am attending to ‘That[said at t2 from perspective π2] is not half-full’. Given
that I have been keeping track of the bottle all the while, my mistake leaves me in a
situation of rational incoherence. So my uses of ‘that’ must share a sense.
(B) I say (while attending to a bottle at time t1 from perspective π1 and intending to
refer to it) ‘That[said at t1 from perspective π1] is half-full’. I can also see a bottle reflected
in a mirror on the wall and (attending to that bottle, which I am seeing from
12
perspective π2, and intending to refer to it) I say ‘That[said at t2 from perspective π2] is not
half full’. In fact my ‘thatt1’ and ‘thatt2’ refer to the same object. But my mistake does
not leave me in a position of rational incoherence. So my uses of ‘that’ must differ in
sense.
(C) You say ‘That[said at t1 from perspective π1) is half-full’. I say ‘That[said at t1 from
perspective π2) is not half-full’. We understand one another’s uses of the term in virtue
of the fact that each of us is using it to refer to the object of our joint attention.
Because we understand one another’s uses of the term, our disagreement puts us into
rational conflict with one another. So my use of ‘that’ and your use of ‘that’ must
share a sense.
(D) You and I are sitting on opposite sides of a screen. Each of us is looking at a
bottle in the unscreened part of the room. I am seeing it from perspective π1. You are
seeing it from perspective π2. We do not realize that we are looking at the same
bottle. I say ‘That[said at t1 from perspective π1] is half-full’. You say ‘That[said at t1 from
perspective π2] is not half-full’. We are not in rational conflict with one another. So our
uses of ‘that’ differ in sense.
A and B present a contrast between two cases of the use of co-referring demonstratives
by a single subject. In A, because I have been keeping track of the bottle all the time, my
utterances of ‘That is half full’ and ‘That is not half full’ bring me into rational
incoherence, so my two uses of ‘that’ must share a sense. In B, my utterances of ‘That is
13
half full’ and ‘That is not half full’ do not bring me into rational incoherence, so my uses
of ‘that’ must differ in sense. C and D present the parallel contrast for the use of co-
referring demonstratives by distinct subjects. In C, our respective utterances of ‘That is
half full’ and ‘That is not half full’ bring us into rational conflict with one another. So our
uses of ‘that’ must share a sense: if my use of ‘that’ and your use of ‘that’ differed in
sense, then when I said ‘That is half-full’ and you said ‘That is not half-full’ there would
be no rational conflict between us. In D our respective utterances of ‘That is half full’ and
‘That is not half full’ do not bring us into rational conflict, so it must be that our uses of
‘that’ differ in sense.
Now compare our description of these cases with Heck’s account of his ‘that
bottle’ example. Heck’s example is a C-type case: you and I understand one another’s
uses of ‘that bottle’ in virtue of the fact that we are jointly attending to the bottle, and
each of us intends to refer, and knows that the other intends to refer, to the object of our
joint attention. But instead of our C, Heck proposes
(C*) You say ‘That[said at t1 from perspective π1) is half-full’. I say ‘That[said at t1 from
perspective π2) is not half-full’. We understand one another’s uses of the term in virtue
of the fact that each of us is using it to refer to the object of our joint attention.
Because we understand one another’s uses of the term, our disagreement puts us into
rational conflict with one another. But our uses of ‘that’ differ in sense. This follows
from the difference in sense between my uses of ‘that’ in case B. So my utterance of
‘That is half full’ and your utterance of ‘That is not half full’ put us in rational
conflict with one another even though our uses of ‘that’ differ in sense.
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C* is a radical departure from the analyses offered in A-D. In A-D, sameness and
difference in sense line up with the presence and absence of rational engagement: if
speakers are using ‘that’ with the same sense, then if one asserts, while the other denies,
 That is F , there is rational tension between them; if one speaker asserts, while
another denies,  That is F without rational tension, the absence of rational tension is
explained by a difference in sense. In C*, in contrast, the suggestion is that you and I are
using ‘that’ with different senses, but your assertion and my denial of  That is F are,
nevertheless, in rational tension. Endorsement of this kind of analysis (a C* analysis as
opposed to an A-D analysis) is just a mark of endorsement of the Moderate Fregean
View. For, according to the Moderate Fregean View, speakers need not attach the same
sense to an expression in order to use it to communicate even though, according to this
view, communication involves rational engagement. It follows that there can be rational
engagement without sameness of sense.
We want to draw two morals from the comparison between Heck’s account of the
‘that bottle’ example (C*) and our account (C). The first moral concerns the relation
between perceptual attention and demonstrative reference. Although our discussion of
this relation is not conclusive, it is an invitation to further reflection on what we consider
to be important connections. The second moral concerns the instability of the Moderate
Fregean View.
There is widespread agreement that if perceptual demonstratives have senses,
their senses are closely related to the contents of the mental states involved in attending
15
to their referents. But philosophers have distinguished at least
15
 three different ways in
which your use of a demonstrative might be based on perceptual attention to its referent.
Firstly, you might be a solo attender, using ‘that’ to refer to an object you are currently
attending to – perhaps continuing to attend to it across time, as in A. Secondly, you might
be a joint attender, using a demonstrative to refer to an object to which you and another
person are jointly attending. Thirdly, you might have the capacity to refer to a thing
demonstratively in virtue of having attended to it in the past and retaining a memory link
which is robust enough to let you refer to it demonstratively. And for each kind of case
there are hard questions to consider about what the content of the experience of attending
is, and how the content of this experience relates to the sense of the demonstrative. Are
there special demands that the content of a perceptual experience must meet if it is to
support the later use of a memory-link perceptual demonstrative? And how does the
content of the initial experience relate to the sense of the demonstrative? How is the
content of your experience when you are tracking an object to be characterized? And
what is the relationship between the content of this experience and the sense of the
demonstratives used in situations like A? Finally, what is the content of our respective
attentional states when we are attending jointly to an object? Does my experience as a
joint attender have the same content as would experience of the same object for a solo
attender in a situation identical to mine (the object is seen from the same spatial
perspective, in the same light, and so on) except for the absence of a co-attender? Or does
joint attention involve an experience of the object whose content is not available to a solo
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attender, so that the presence of the co-attender makes a difference to the content of the
attentional state? And, however the contents of the experiences involved in joint attention
are to be characterized, how do these contents relate to the senses of demonstratives used
by jointly attending subjects?
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We cannot discuss these questions in detail here. But we do think that our
discussion of Heck’s ‘that bottle’ case puts us in a position to say the following about
how the eventual answers to the questions about single subject cases, on the one hand,
and joint attention cases on the other, must go. Heck seems to be assuming a very simple
model of the relationship between single-subject-no-tracking uses of demonstratives
(cases like B), and demonstratives used in cases of joint attention. Heck’s C* assumes
that the content of your experience of a bottle to which you and I are jointly attending is
the same as the content of an experience involved in solo attention to the bottle from your
spatial perspective. It assumes that the content of my experience of the bottle when we
are jointly attending is identical to the content of the experience of a solo attender looking
at the bottle from my perspective. And it assumes that the relationship between the
content of the attentional states which underwrite a solo attender’s uses of perceptual
demonstratives and the senses of these demonstratives will just carry over to the case of
joint attention, so that a difference in experiential content which would generate a
difference in sense for a solo attender will generate a difference in sense for joint
attenders too. Given these assumptions, and only given these assumptions, is C* a
legitimate account of the ‘That bottle’ case. But we have suggested that C* is not a
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legitimate account of the ‘that bottle’ case. It follows that the assumptions which generate
it must be wrong. The simple model of how reference based on joint attention relates to
reference based on solo attention is overly simple, and should be rejected.
The second moral we want to draw from discussion of the ‘that bottle’ case
concerns the instability of the Moderate Fregean View that Heck is endorsing and the
superiority of ECF. We saw in §1 that Heck embeds the Hybrid View in a larger
discussion that places the issues of cognitive significance and what is said in the wider
context of understanding the nature of communication. And he insists further that an
understanding of the nature of communication should embed in a more general account
of how justification and knowledge are transmitted. In the closing section of ‘The Sense
of Communication’, Heck notes that the considerations he adduces to argue against the
Hybrid View “can be used to argue that the notion of the sense of an expression ought to
be explained, in part, in terms of the notion of justification”.
17
 In ‘Do Demonstratives
Have Senses?’ Heck expands on the idea and tells us that the transmission of information
is an aspect of more general considerations, without which
one cannot evaluate, contradict or endorse [a] claim...more generally, one is in no
position at all to engage the speaker rationally...Communication does serve to make the
transfer of information from speaker to speaker possible, but, more fundamentally, it
serves to make it possible for people to engage one another rationally...
18
Heck’s point is that communication is a form of rational engagement: any account of
communication which does not take this into account is wrong.
But the moral of analyses A-D is that questions about Fregean sense are closely
tied to questions about rational engagement too. Frege introduces the notion of sense
                                                 
17
 ‘The Sense of Communication’ 104
18
 ‘Do Demonstratives Have Senses?’ 16
18
precisely to distinguish between cases where there is rational engagement and cases
where there is not. And this is why Heck’s moderate Fregean view is unstable. Heck
argues that speakers can communicate using a name even though they do not attach the
same sense to it: C* is a description of an alleged case of this kind. But once you have
acknowledged (as Heck does) that subjects are using a name to communicate iff their
uses of the name are in rational engagement, you will be able to keep Fregean sense at
bay in this way only by denying the connection between rational engagement and
Fregean sense. And to deny this connection is to ignore the real explanatory role that the
notion of sense is introduced to serve.
In the final section we develop the considerations operative in the worked
example of this section at a more theoretical level. We suggest a revision to the standard
understanding of Frege’s puzzle about informative identities that allows us to strengthen
our argument against the Moderate Fregean View, to show how the possibility of ECF
arises, and to say on what the answer to the question ‘Is there such a thing as Fregean
sense?’ really depends.
3 Understanding Frege’s puzzle
On a standard understanding of the explanatory role of the notion of sense, an
expression’s sense is its ‘meaning’ in the sense of ‘meaning’ in which expressions differ
in meaning iff they occupy different roles in our rational cognitive lives. This explanatory
role generates the following individuating principle for senses:
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The Standard Individuating Principle for Senses (SIP) – ‘a’ and ‘b’ differ in sense iff a
subject who understood both expressions could, at a single time, both assent to ‘a is F’
and withhold assent from, or reject, ‘b is F’ without loss of rational coherence.
The first step in deepening our understanding of Frege’s Puzzle is to recognize two kinds
of explanation that a notion of sense which can solve the puzzle must be able to provide.
The first, and most familiar, kind of explanatory role for the notion of sense is in
the explanation of how it is possible, without loss of rational coherence, to understand
two names for the same object without recognizing that the names co-refer. We shall call
this kind of explanation a ‘multiplying’ explanation, because it is an explanation in which
the role of the notion of sense is to make available more thoughts than would be
recognized if thoughts were individuated in terms of reference alone. The thought that
Hesperus is a planet and the thought that Phosphorus is a planet are about the same
object. If thoughts are individuated by reference alone, to believe that Hesperus is a
planet while disbelieving that (or having doubts about whether) Phosphorus is a planet is
to have conflicting cognitive attitudes towards the same thought. Having conflicting
cognitive attitudes to the same thought is a kind of rational incoherence. But believing
that Hesperus is a planet but not that Phosphorus is a planet is not a kind of rational
incoherence. So the individuation of thoughts in terms of reference alone leads to errors
in evaluating a thinker’s rational status. Right evaluation of a thinker’s rational status
requires finer individuation of thoughts. When the notion of sense plays its multiplying
role, it secures this finer individuation.
We shall call the second kind of explanation that the notion of sense must provide
a ‘consolidating’ explanation. The notion of sense provides consolidating explanations in
situations where full understanding of a term generates the possibility of what we shall
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call an ‘immediate extension of knowledge’. To see how this kind of possibility arises,
consider the following inference schema, which we shall call ‘Existential Generalisation
with “&”’ (‘EG&’) (where ‘F’ and ‘G’ are schematic letters ranging over predicates and
the gaps are to be filled by token singular terms):
EG&
… is F
… is G
--------------------------------
Something is both F and G.
Now suppose that we fill the gaps in an instance of EG& with co-referential terms ν and
µ, and consider what the effect might be of adding  ν = µ  to the inference as an extra
premiss. There are three possible cases. The extra identity premiss appears in italics.
The first possibility is that the addition of the identity premiss turns an invalid
argument (one whose premisses might be true while its conclusion is false) into a valid
one. If we suppose (as Frege did) that definite descriptions are singular terms,
19
 the
following is an example of this kind
The last great philosopher of antiquity was taught by Plato.
The philosopher who taught Alexander sat on Bucephelus.
The last great philosopher of antiquity is the philosopher who taught Alexander.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some individual was both taught by Plato and sat on Bucephelus.
Without the extra identity premiss the argument is invalid. Adding the identity premiss
turns an invalid argument into a valid one.
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 See, for example, his remarks on the construction of ‘compound proper names’ at ‘On Sense and
Reference’ 70-71.
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The second possibility is that the argument is already valid, but the addition of the
identity premiss alters its potential role in the extension of knowledge. Supposing, as
Frege did, that functional names are singular terms,
20
 here is an example of this second
kind of case:
(2 × 2) × 2 is greater than five.
(2 + 2) + (2 + 2) is the number of coins in my pocket.
(2 × 2) × 2 is (2 + 2) + (2 + 2)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some number greater than five is the number of coins in my pocket.
This argument is already valid (in the intuitive sense of ‘validity’ – its premisses cannot
be true while its conclusion is false) without the extra identity premiss. But, though it
does not contribute to making the argument valid, the identity premiss still has a role to
play. If you are given just the initial two premisses, you have work to do to show why the
argument is valid: the work involved in establishing the identity premiss. Before this
work is done, you might resist the move from the premisses to the conclusion without
being guilty of rational incoherence. In fact, until you have established the truth of the
identity premiss, resisting the move to the conclusion is the rational thing to do: until you
have established the identity premiss you do not know that the move to the conclusion is
valid.
Both of these cases – the case where the inference is invalid, and the case where it
is valid but you could fail to see that it is without loss of rational coherence – are cases in
which the notion of sense is providing a multiplying explanation. In each case, the terms
inserted into the gaps in the EG& schema differ in sense. The difference in sense explains
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why you could believe both premisses of each instance of EG& but not be rationally
compelled to move to the conclusion.
But now consider the third kind of case which results from plugging co-referring
terms into the gaps in EG&. In this kind of case the resulting inference is valid, and there
is no job at all for an extra identity premiss to do – not even a job in providing a rational
but logically non-omniscient creature (like one of us) with justification for moving to the
conclusion. In this kind of case, the premisses not only entail the conclusion. They also,
as they stand and without the need for an extra identity premiss, rationally compel the
move to the conclusion.
Here is an example which brings out the precise difference between this third kind
of case and the cases where there is a role for the extra identity premiss to play. Let ‘f’
and ‘f 
-1
’designate an arbitrary invertible function and its inverse, where the inverse is
defined such that the composition of f with its inverse f 
-1
 yields the identity function I
(the inverse is defined such that (f 
-1
 ° f) = I). Now consider
(f 
-1
 ° f) (a)
 
is F
I (a) is G
---------------------------------
Something is both F and G
And let us ask our usual question: What might the effect be of adding the identity premiss
‘(f
-1
 ° f)(a) is I (a)’ to this inference? The effect is not going to be to turn an invalid
argument into a valid one. For the argument is valid as it stands. And nor is the effect to
turn a valid argument whose validity might not be transparent to someone who
understands all the terms involved into one whose validity will be transparent to anyone
who has this kind of understanding. To see why not, compare this inference with the
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previous example, and suppose that in each case you are trying to explain why the
inference without the identity premiss is valid to someone who does not yet see that it is.
In the ‘(2 × 2) × 2’ and ‘(2 + 2) + (2 + 2)’ case, you would show that the inference is
valid by proving the identity statement. For example, you might provide a proof in Peano
Arithmetic. And because there is room for a proof of the identity statement, the fact that
the person you are dealing with does not yet see that the inference is valid gives you no
reason to doubt that he or she understands the expressions involved: someone might
understand the expressions involved but fail to see that the instance of EG& is valid just
in virtue of not having done the work required to prove the identity statement. In the  ‘(f
-1
° f)(a)’ and ‘I (a)’ case, by contrast, there is no work to do in ‘proving’ the identity
statement.  The identity statement is true by definition. It will already be known by
anyone who fully understands the expressions it contains. So someone who fails to see
that the instance of EG& is valid (as it stands, without the identity premiss) does not yet
understand the expressions involved (does not grasp the definitions). Explaining the
inference’s validity would be a matter of going over the definitions until they are properly
understood. In the ‘(2 × 2) × 2’ and ‘(2 + 2) + (2 + 2)’ case, full understanding of the
singular terms does not entail knowing that they co-refer. In the ‘(f
-1
 ° f) (a)’ and ‘I (a)’
case, full understanding does entail knowledge of co-reference.  Someone who cannot see
the validity of the instance of EG& is not lacking a proof of the identity statement. He or
she is lacking a full understanding of the expressions involved.
We shall say that in this third kind of case full understanding of the singular terms
generates the possibility of the ‘immediate extension of knowledge’: in this kind of case,
if I have full understanding of ν and µ, I know that ν and µ co-refer, and so I am in a
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position to move from a premiss containing ν and a premiss containing µ to a conclusion
about the expressions’ common referent without needing to establish the truth of  ν =
µ . Furthermore, if I resist this move I bring myself into rational incoherence. And it is
in this kind of case that we need the notion of sense to perform its consolidating role. In
the first two kinds of case, we multiplied senses (recognized that ν and µ differ in sense)
to explain one kind of pattern of rational relations between attitudes. In this third kind of
case we must consolidate senses (recognize that ν and µ have the same sense) to explain
another. A consolidating explanation posits sameness in sense to explain cases in which
full understanding generates the possibility of an immediate extension of knowledge:
where ν and µ share a sense, anyone who fully understands both ν and µ knows that they
co-refer, so the move to the conclusion is available without the detour through an identity
premiss; and resisting the move is rationally incoherent.
Note that the notion of sense can provide multiplying explanations iff it can
provide consolidating explanations: difference in sense can explain why the extra identity
premiss is required to make moving to the conclusion rational in some cases iff sameness
of sense explains why it is not required in others.
We think it is fair to say that consolidating explanations have been the poor
relation in discussions of what senses must be like to provide a solution to Frege’s
Puzzle. Now we want to suggest that the Moderate Fregean View and SIP both owe
whatever initial plausibility they have to this tendency to focus on multiplying
explanations and ignore the need for consolidating explanations, and that when the need
to recognise both kinds of explanation is acknowledged the initial plausibility of both the
Moderate Fregean View and SIP falls away.
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We begin by reconstructing the kind of reasoning that leads the Moderate Fregean
to a view in which there is rational engagement without shared senses. (This supplements
in slightly more abstract terms the discussion in §2 concerning Heck’s reasoning about
the ‘that bottle’ case). The Moderate Fregean’s reasoning goes like this.
First, it is noticed that there are situations in which expressions are used without
rational engagement. For example, in Heck’s account of the ‘that bottle’ case, it is
noticed that there is a situation Σ1 in which a single speaker can use two tokens of ‘that
bottle’ from different perspectives π1 and π2 without knowing that the same object is in
question, and therefore without any possibility for an immediate extension of knowledge
concerning the properties of a single object over time (this a B-type case, in the taxonomy
from §2). Second, it is concluded that the two tokens of ‘that bottle’ are being used with
different senses from the two perspectives (so this is a multiplying explanation). Finally,
a distinct situation Σ2 involving two tokens of ‘that bottle’ is envisioned in which π1 and
π2 are again in play, but where there is rational engagement (a C-type case). For example,
a situation is envisioned in which two speakers use tokens of ‘that bottle’ from
perspectives π1 and π2, but where the speakers are jointly attending to an object.
This brings one to a point where a theoretical choice needs to be made. One can
either continue to take the different perspectives to entail a difference in sense, despite
the rational engagement, or recognize that the fact that there is rational engagement (and
so the possibility of immediate extension of knowledge) calls for a consolidating
explanation, despite the difference in perspectives. And at this point the tendency to focus
on the multiplying role points in the direction of the former alternative. In Σ1, a single
speaker, without loss of rational coherence, accepts one token of  That bottle is F
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without accepting another, where the two tokens of ‘that bottle’ are used from
perspectives π1 and π2. To explain how this is possible, we must posit a difference in
sense between the tokens of ‘that bottle’ used from π1 in Σ1 and from π2 in Σ1. If we are
focusing just on the multiplying role, the temptation is to conclude that π1 and π2 generate
a difference in sense, and hence that even in Σ2, where the two tokens are used from
perspectives π1 and π2 in such a way that that speakers are in rational engagement, the
expressions are being used with different senses. So a focus on the multiplying role leads
the Moderate Fregean to allow that there can be rational engagement where senses are not
shared.
But the notion of sense can perform its multiplying role iff it can perform its
consolidating role. Difference in sense can explain why there is not rational engagement
in Σ1
 
iff sameness of sense explains why there is rational engagement in Σ2. So, the
Moderate Fregean View is unstable: where there is rational engagement, there is
sameness of sense. 
Now consider SIP. The need to recognize the consolidating role of the notion of
sense undermines SIP because SIP is synchronic and intrapersonal – it deals in rational
engagement between the attitudes that a single subject has at a time. But obviously there
can be rational engagement between attitudes held at different times and by different
subjects. So a notion of sense which can explain rational engagement wherever it arises –
and so can discharge all of the explanatory obligations that a notion of sense which really
solves Frege’s Puzzle must be able to fill – must be individuated more widely than SIP
allows. Here are two examples to illustrate this point.
First, consider a situation in which I demonstratively refer to an object that I am
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tracking across time. Suppose that at t1 I say
That is F(at t1).
And at t2, having kept track of the object all the while – suppose that I am watching it
move along in the middle distance without taking my eyes off it – I say
That is G(at t2).
This is a situation in which, in virtue of the fact that I have been tracking the object, there
is the possibility of immediately extending my knowledge and concluding
Something was F(at t1) and is G(at t2).
In this situation, full understanding of the singular terms contained in the premisses
generates the possibility of the immediate extension of knowledge. So this must be a case
in which full understanding of co-referring terms involves knowledge of co-reference: if
full understanding did not involve knowledge of co-reference, full understanding would
not generate the possibility of an immediate extension of knowledge. But full
understanding of ν and µ involves knowledge of co-reference iff ν and µ share a sense.
So my use of ‘that’ at t1 and my use of ‘that’ at t2 share a sense. And if this is right, then
SIP is inadequate, precisely because it is synchronic. To respect the fact that my uses of
‘that’ at t1 and t2 share a sense, we need an individuating principle that acknowledges that
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sense individuation is sensitive to the possibility of extending knowledge diachronically.
Again, consider a situation in which you and I are using a demonstrative to refer
to an object to which we are jointly attending. You say
That is F(at t1).
I say
That is G(at t1).
Each of us hears and understands what the other says. So either of us would be warranted
in moving to the conclusion
Something is both F(at t1) and G(at t1).
In this case, again, my use of ‘that’ and your use of ‘that’ must share a sense. It is because
the tokens of ‘that’ share a sense that (assuming that each of our initial utterances
expresses knowledge) we can use each other’s claims to extend what we know without
going through the extra step of establishing that the same object is in question for both
speakers. More generally, if you and I are jointly attending to an object, and fully
understand one another’s uses of demonstratives to refer to the object, each of us, in
virtue of this full understanding, knows that we are referring to the same thing. So we can
gain knowledge about the object from each other immediately, without going through the
29
extra step of establishing that the same object is in question for each of us. But if this is
right, then SIP is inadequate, precisely because it is intrapersonal. To respect the fact that
our respective uses of ‘that’ share a sense, we need an individuating principle for sense
that acknowledges that sense individuation is sensitive to the possibilities of immediately
extending knowledge interpersonally.
We are now in a position to answer the Moderate Fregean challenge to ECF. ECF
is the view that a token singular term’s contribution to what is said by a sentence
containing it is the equivalence class of modes of presentation that speakers who
understand one another’s uses of it might take it to have. Heck, our representative of the
Moderate Fregean View, says that to identify the contribution to what is said with an
equivalence class of modes of presentation is to ‘define something shared [between
speakers who can communicate using a name] into existence’
21
, and that the defined
notion would be a ‘theoretical construct looking for work’
22
. We have taken his point to
be this. Unless there is something uniting the members of the equivalence class other than
just that speakers who attach these modes of presentation to a token singular term will be
able to use it to communicate, a notion of what is said defined in this way lies no deeper
than the facts about when we can and cannot communicate, so cannot be used to explain
them.
But from the perspective of our criticism of SIP, there is an account ready to hand
of what unifies the elements of the equivalence class of modes of presentation into the
senses of ECF. The account centers on the idea of a situation which generates the
possibility of immediate extension of knowledge. Communication with demonstrative-
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involving utterances where interlocutors are jointly attending to an object is one example
of a situation of this kind. But it is only one example of the more general phenomenon.
Our strategy has been to place that example in a larger pattern of examples that sees the
nature of sense as constituted by relations between ignorance or knowledge of co-
reference and the possibilities of extending knowledge. The principle that sameness of
sense marks cases in which the immediate extension of knowledge is possible is a general
principle that can collect modes of presentation into equivalence classes that can be
identified with the senses of token singular terms.
23
 This principle supplies a ground for
collecting modes of presentation into equivalence classes that runs deeper than the fact
that interlocutors engaged in communication are communicating, because it is a principle
that applies whenever the possibility of extending knowledge in an immediate way is
present.
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Let us summarise the section so far. We started by arguing that a notion of sense
which can really solve Frege’s Puzzle must be able to provide both multiplying and
consolidating explanations, where the need for consolidating explanation arises wherever
there is the possibility of immediate extension of knowledge. Then we showed how
ignoring this point, and focusing on multiplying explanations alone, generates the
Moderate Fregean View. Next we argued that, once the need for a notion of sense that
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can provide consolidating explanations is generated, SIP is undermined. To provide
consolidating explanations wherever they are required, we need a notion of sense that
allows for both diachronic and interpersonal rational engagement. Finally, we have
argued that the line of thought that undermines SIP also provides the resources to answer
the Moderate Fregean challenge to ECF. (Note that this is to be expected, given that
ignoring this line of thought is what generates the Moderate Fregean View.)
It remains to say how senses are actually individuated. We close this paper with a
rough account of the kind of criterion of individuation that is needed.
Note first that what we need is an account of the conditions under which token
singular terms agree or differ in sense relative to a situation. This is because our version
of ECF collects together modes of presentation differently in different situations: cases in
which a speaker tracks an object, or interlocutors jointly attend to an object, collect
together modes of presentation differently from cases in which tracking or joint attention
is absent, despite the fact that the modes of presentation involved may be the same in
both kinds of case. More formally, the need to relativize is determined by the fact that
that an individuating principle for sense is an abstraction principle that specifies co-
sensicality in terms of the possibility of the immediate extension of knowledge – what we
have also been calling rational engagement – between uses of those token singular terms
with associated modes of presentation. But use of token singular term ν with associated
mode of presentation Mν  is rationally engaged with use of token singular term µ with
associated mode of presentation Mµ is not an equivalence relation.
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We will now state the individuating principle we want to propose. Let a situation
be a structure consisting in times, agents, and a set of what we shall call ‘engagement-
relevant factors’. To keep the discussion simple, let us focus only on cases involving at
most two times, and two agents. And to get our proposal on the table, let us suppose that
the ‘engagement-relevant factors’ include only the factors which have arisen in the paper
so far as relevant to rational engagement. These factors include things like whether a
single agent tracks an object continuously across the time interval of the situation, and
whether the two agents in a situation are jointly attending to an object (a full discussion
would recognize additional factors, for example, factors involving recognitional
capacities, and factors associated with rational engagement for proper names).
Then where tν and tµ are the times of utterance of ν and µ, Sν and Sµ are the agents uttering
ν and µ, and Mν and Mµ are the modes of presentation these agents attach to ν and µ,
Revised Individuating Principle for Senses – The sense of ν (used by Sν at tν with mode of
presentation Mν)  = the sense of µ (as used by Sµ  at tµ with mode of presentation Mµ) iff
the engagement-relevant factors in the situation of use generate the possibility of the
immediate extension of knowledge.
That is, the senses of ν and µ are the same in a situation iff the engagement-relevant
factors in the situation generate the possibility of an immediate extension of knowledge.
Are senses individuated in this way just artificial constructs looking for work? To
see why we think they are not, consider the comparison between our criterion and SIP.
According to SIP, sense is just that level of meaning at which ‘a’ and ‘b’ share a meaning
iff I would be guilty of rational incoherence if I doubted ‘a=b’, or affirmed ‘Fa’ at t but
denied ‘Fb’ at t, or affirmed ‘Fa’ and ‘Gb’ at t but refused to move to ‘∃x(Fx & Gx)’ at t.
The move to ECF is just the move to extending the account of this level of meaning to
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recognise that questions about rational coherence and incoherence arise not just with
respect to a single speaker at a single time, but also with respect to a single speaker over
time, and different speakers separated at a time and over time. From the perspective that
we have developed in the last two sections it is the standard, restricted notion of sense,
embodied by SIP, which ends up looking artificial. We have emphasized that rational
engagement is not just intra-personal and synchronic. To recognise a level of meaning
(the level of sense) at which the ‘meanings’ of expressions are individuated by criteria
involving rational engagement, but maintain that only synchronic intra-personal rational
engagement matters is to stipulate an artificial boundary where no natural boundary
arises.
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